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This thesis focuses on the issue of whether or not the government is ever justified
in prohibiting the actions of an individual who is harming herself but not others. I first
analyze some of the key historical figures in the paternalism debate and argue that these
accounts fail to adequately meet the needs of a modern, pluralistic society. Then, I
analyze and critique the nuanced, soft-paternalist strategy put forth by Joel Feinberg.
Finally, I defend a version of hard paternalism, arguing that a balancing strategy that
examines each action on a case-by-case basis shows all citizens equal, and adequate
concern and respect.
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I. Introduction

The issue of whether or not, and to what degree, the government is justified in
preventing an individual from harming himself is the source of much disagreement
among judges, policymakers, and philosophers. Classical thinkers1 had defended a strong
form of paternalism that one could label “legal moralism.” Legal moralism is the idea
that the state is morally permitted to prohibit certain actions if the actions are inherently
immoral. In modern times, John Stuart Mill broke from the paternalist tradition with his
anti-paternalist argument that the only legitimate use of coercion by government is to
stop actions that do harm to persons other than the agent. The paternalist views of the
classical thinkers had endorsed the idea that the government is responsible for creating
virtuous citizens, and that this responsibility allowed the government to prohibit
individuals from harming themselves. In contrast, Mill’s anti-paternalism can be
described as allowing people to “live and let live.” According to Mill, human beings will
flourish best in an environment where the government does not interfere with actions that
do not harm others.
Contemporary philosophers have continued to analyze the paternalist and antipaternalist positions while drawing new distinctions. In the third volume of his series The
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, titled Harm to Self, Joel Feinberg specifically
addresses problems that surround paternalism. In the tradition of Mill, Feinberg argues
1

When I use the term “classical” in this thesis, I am referring specifically to the ideas of Aristotle and
Aquinas. I will only use the term when I am referring to ideas that I believe both Aristotle and Aquinas
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for a qualified form of anti-paternalism that he calls soft-paternalism. He claims the state
should only interfere with harmful actions that do not affect others when the actions are
non-voluntary. Feinberg's position is paternalistic because it allows the state to intervene
to prevent a person from harming himself; his version of paternalism is "soft" because
government interference is only warranted when the individual's conduct is not
sufficiently voluntary. In other words, if an action is sufficiently voluntary and causes no
harm to others, the state has no business legally prohibiting the action due to the potential
harm to the individual. In contrast with the soft paternalist, the hard paternalist concludes
that in some cases the government is justified in preventing individuals from committing
harmful, self-regarding acts that are voluntary. Although hard paternalists consider the
autonomy of an individual committing a harmful self-regarding action, the hard
paternalists also factor in an individual's safety and well-being when deciding whether or
not government intervention is permissible. The hard paternalist concludes that in some
cases the fact that a person is harming herself provides a relevant (yet not necessarily
sufficient) reason for the government to interfere, whereas the soft paternalist never
views voluntary, self-regarding harm as a reason justifying government intervention.
In the first section of this thesis, I examine the legal moralism of Aristotle and
Aquinas. Although their form of paternalism may have been defensible in pre-modern
societies, it fails to be an acceptable theory due to the conditions of modern pluralism. I
review several anti-paternalist arguments put forth by Mill in the second section. Mill

share. I also recognize that some ancient and medieval thinkers differ from Aristotle and Aquinas greatly,
and I am not referring to such thinkers when I use the term in this thesis.
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does not adequately clarify key terms in the debate such as harm and voluntariness, and I
argue that he fails to explain how a society based on the harm principle would maximize
social utility. In the third section, I outline Feinberg’s nuanced soft-paternalist strategy,
in which he uses personal autonomy and notions of consent to ground his position that
the state should not interfere with self-regarding actions. In the final section, I further
examine Feinberg's standard of voluntariness. I provide both real and hypothetical
examples to help illustrate the difficulties in applying the voluntariness standard.
Although I argue that the indeterminate voluntariness standard is difficult to apply, I will
not attempt to formulate an alternate standard. With the help of ideas from Ronald
Dworkin, I argue instead that the weakness in the soft-paternalist strategy is not the
formulation of the voluntariness standard, but the claim that the only good and relevant
reasons for government intervention into self-regarding actions are reasons pertaining to
whether or not an action is sufficiently voluntary. I conclude with a defense of hard
paternalism, arguing that in some cases it is permissible for the government to intervene
in the life of an individual for the sake of his personal safety and well-being.

II. Paternalistic Views of Aristotle and Aquinas

Aristotle argues that just as every person performs actions that aim at particular
goods, a community or state also aims at some collective good. The best community will
aim at the highest of all goods, and Aristotle argues that the “highest” good that any state
should aim at is happiness. He writes,

4

We see that every city-state is a community of some sort, and that every
community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone
performs an action for the sake of what he takes to be good). Clearly, then,
while every community aims at some good, the community that has the
most authority of all and encompasses all the other aims highest, that is to
say, at the good that has the most authority of all.2
The good that has the most authority, or happiness, is not a hedonistic celebration of
sensual pleasure. Instead, Aristotle argues that happiness is an “activity of the soul.”3
The activity of happiness can only be achieved through living in accordance with virtue
or areté. An example will help to elucidate this point. A knife’s essential attribute is the
activity of cutting, and the virtue, or areté, of a knife is that it is able to cut well. A
“virtuous” knife would be a knife that can easily cut many different objects.
The essential attribute of man for Aristotle is man’s unique ability to reason, and
the virtuous man leads the good life by using his reason effectively to determine which
acts avoid excess and deficiency, hitting the mean. While the individual aims at her own
happiness, the state must attempt to promote the intellectual and moral development of its
citizens. The state accomplishes this goal by creating an environment that fosters moral
growth, and this for Aristotle is “living well,” or happiness. Aristotle explains:
[I]t is not enough if they [the citizens] get the correct upbringing and
attention when they are young; rather, they must continue the same
practices and be habituated to them when they become men. Hence we
need laws concerned with these things…For the many yield to compulsion
more than to argument, and to sanctions more than to the fine.4

2

Aristotle, Politics, tr. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 1.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 9.
4
Ibid., 168.
3
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So, in contrast with many contemporary liberals, Aristotle argues that not only does the
state have a right to act paternalistically when it is in the best interest of the individual,
but at times the state has a duty to do so. The state must not only protect its citizens, but
also help them to be happy.
Just as Aristotle argues that the government of a state should aim to promote
virtue in its citizens, Aquinas (relying on many of Aristotle’s arguments) argues that a
state is only truly a state when serving the common good:
The end of the good life that we live on earth is the happiness of heaven, it
is the duty of the king to promote the good life of the community so that it
leads to the happiness in heaven—so that he could command the things
that lead to heavenly bliss and as far as possible forbid their opposite.5

For Aquinas, the most important “good” is to serve God. The state should aim at creating
virtuous subjects in order to serve God, and so that the subjects can ultimately gain true
happiness in heaven. One way a state helps to create virtuous subjects is by enacting just
laws that forbid immoral acts. Aquinas argues that human laws are just if they help to
promote the law of God, and human laws must forbid acts which violate the law of God. .
In order to better understand why Aquinas argues that a state should aim at
serving God and creating virtuous citizens, it is important to include a brief analysis of
certain aspects of Aquinas’ metaphysics. For Aquinas, metaphysics, morality, and law are
all intimately connected, and it will prove useful to review some general aspects of his
theory before moving to the more specific topic of this investigation.

5

Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, tr. and ed. Paul E. Sigmund
(New York: Norton Company, 1988), 28.
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Aquinas states that generally speaking “[l]aw is a rule and measure of acts,
whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting; for lex is derived from ligare,
because it binds one to act.”6 Since a law is binding, it creates an obligation, and Aquinas
argues that a law must aim at the common good to be a law.7 Therefore, a law obligates a
person to aim at the common good, which for Aquinas can be none other than God.
Aquinas distinguishes between three types of law: eternal law, natural law, and
human law. Eternal law is divine reason, and although one knows eternal law exists, one
can never fully understand or grasp the complexity of eternal law. However, natural law
derives from eternal law, and one can grasp natural law through the faculty of the
intellect.8 Aquinas argues that the intellect allows man to intuitively grasp fundamental
first principles, and the fact that man should seek the good and God is such a principle.
From this principle, one must then use reason to determine that a state should seek the
common good, and how one can establish a state to best meet this end. Man intuitively
grasps general moral precepts from natural law, and one proceeds to apply these general
maxims to specific situations with human reasoning.9 The sovereign power creates
“human laws” by using reasoning to decide the best way in which the laws can help to
serve the common good and create virtuous citizens who aim at beatitude.
In On Princely Government, Aquinas shows the way in which human laws can be
derived from natural laws. Aquinas argues that a “diversity of human interests” exists,
6

Thomas Aquinas, Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Modern Library,
1948), 610.
7
Ibid., 612.
8
Ibid., 618.
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and that since there are many ways in which man could pursue his goals, man “needs
guidance for attaining his ends.”10 One can derive from the intellect and natural law that
unity and order are beneficial. In particular, if a multitude of people with differing desires
all reside in a community, the community must have some controlling principle that
unites all of the citizens. So, Aquinas argues that part of the essence of a state is that it
aims at common, unified good.11
The sovereign should aim at establishing a state that best assists people in finding
true happiness, and happiness is achieved through fulfilling our nature and following
divine law. Like Aristotle, Aquinas believes that man should foster his unique ability to
reason and live in accordance with virtue. The virtuous man leads the good life by using
his reason effectively to determine which acts are just, and then performing those acts in
order to best serve God. Through the grace of God, individuals will be able to lead a life
worthy of gaining them admission into heaven, and therefore the sovereign should
promote acts that could lead to their “happiness in heaven” and forbid those acts that
might frustrate this end.12
Much like a knife must be frequently sharpened in order to be fit to cut well, a
man must habituate himself to get closer to perfect virtue. A man must remove himself
from “undue pleasures,” and Aquinas argues, “a man must receive this training from

9

Ibid., 620.
Aquinas, On Kingship, tr. Sigmund, 14.
11
Ibid., 15.
12
Ibid., 28.
10
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another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.”13 Furthermore, Aquinas argues
that this “training” can be implemented by creating laws that forbid certain immoral acts.
A person will refuse to perform these immoral acts first out of fear of punishment, but
then the person may willingly become virtuous after behaving in the correct manner
becomes habitual. A person can misuse his reason in order to rationalize satisfying his
passion, and this needs to be prohibited.14 Human laws can help an individual to achieve
the discipline needed to live virtuously, and this should be the goal of any state.
For Aquinas, the goal of the individual subject and the goal of the state should not
be distinguished: both should aim to live in accordance with virtue and serve God.
However, it is important to note that Aquinas does not argue that all moral matters should
be legislated. Due to the limited nature of human laws, practical concerns sometimes
outweigh the benefits of legislating morality. Aquinas writes:
[H]uman law does not prohibit every vice from which virtuous men
abstain, but only the more serious ones from which the majority can
abstain, especially those that harm others and which must be prohibited for
human society to survive, such as homicide, theft and the like.15
Although Aquinas takes harm to others as the principal grounds for legally prohibiting an
activity, he indicates that it is not the sole ground. Even though Aquinas recognizes that it
is more important to legislate against some vices than others for the sake of a peaceful
society, the type of tension that emerges in a modern, liberal society between the public

13

Aquinas, Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, 647.
Ibid.
15
Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, 55.
14
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and private sphere is absent. Both the subject and the sovereign should recognize the
importance of serving the interest of the common good, God.
A just state allows the individual to grow and progress morally through the state,
a state that assists the individual in her goal of virtuous living. Although Aquinas argues
that the state should not always intervene through legislation for the sake of the
individual, the state is often justified in paternalistic interference. The model state for
Aquinas would be a state that operates as an organic unity, with both the sovereign and
the subjects all working as one toward the same singular goal of serving God. Civil and
criminal laws aimed specifically at promoting moral acts and prohibiting immoral acts
are not necessarily restrictive and an imposition on an individual’s freedoms; instead laws
that prohibit immoral acts can help the individual follow God's law and attain her
ultimate end of entering the Kingdom of Heaven.
Both Aristotle and Aquinas consider politics to be teleological; the state should
aim at a unified end. The end, or telos, for both thinkers is happiness, although for
Aristotle happiness is living in accordance with virtue, and for Aquinas virtuous living
must be directed towards God and Heaven. The assumption for both Aristotle and
Aquinas is that subjects or citizens adhere to a single, comprehensive doctrine of what is
“good” or divine because all individuals share a basic nature. However, even though
moral disputes certainly occurred in pre-modern societies, it is much more difficult to
agree upon an accepted moral doctrine in a modern democracy due to the number of
people playing a role in government decision making and the extreme diversity of
opinions. Difficulties could emerge if a modern nation like the United States tried to unite

10

all of its citizens with a single religious doctrine because a multitude of different religious
beliefs exist, and many people do not adhere to any religion at all.
John Rawls refers to the existence of many different and competing moral
doctrines as the fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls states:
The fact of reasonable pluralism limits what is practicably possible under
the conditions of our social world, as opposed to conditions in other
historical ages when people are often said to have been united (though
perhaps they never have been) in affirming one comprehensive
conception.16
The paternalism of Aristotle and Aquinas aims to create an environment where the state
and the laws promote virtue, and restrict or discourage vice. In a modern, liberal society,
few politicians and citizens can agree which behaviors are virtuous. Furthermore, the aim
of many modern citizens is not admission into heaven or the type of “happiness” for
which Aristotle argues. The legal moralism of the classical thinkers allows the state to
prohibit immoral actions, even if the actions only harm the individual. For example,
Aquinas might argue that laws prohibiting consensual homosexual acts or consensual
adultery are just, even though these acts only "harm" the consenting adults.17 But,
reasonable pluralism leads not only to a diversity of opinions on what actions are “right”
or beneficial, but also which actions are deemed wrong or harmful. Aquinas recognized
that it was not always practical to legislate every human vice, and that the government
should be most concerned with maintaining order and keeping individuals from harming

16

John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001), 4-5.
Aquinas does not explicitly state that homosexual or adulterous acts would warrant government
intervention. However, it is plausible that he would defend such laws due to his views on the function of
the law and on the immoral nature of homosexuality and adultery.
17
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each other. Still, he concluded that the ruler should unify his subjects and direct them
towards a particular notion of God. In a modern society, it is not only impractical to
systematically direct citizens toward a single goal; it is also unreasonable. The competing
doctrines of a diverse group of people leave contemporary society with no single, clear
aim. Actions cannot be prohibited strictly on the grounds that they are wrong or immoral
if society cannot reach any agreement over what should be deemed immoral. For this
reason, the paternalism of Aristotle and Aquinas fails to meet the needs of a modern
society. Any theory that emerges to address the role of government in limiting the liberty
of individuals must address the diversity of interests, desires, and moral doctrines.

III. Mill’s Anti-Paternalism

Recognizing the diversity of human interests in a modern society, John Stuart
Mill contends that concrete criteria are needed to determine where the line should be
drawn between tyranny and legitimate government interference. In what later theorists
refer to as the "harm principle," Mill writes:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community against his will, is prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant.18
According to the harm principle, the government can only legitimately restrict liberty of a
competent adult when the government is preventing the person from directly harming
another unwilling individual. It is important to clearly understand the way in which Mill

18

John Stuart Mill, On liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 9.
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uses key terms in defining the harm principle. Competent adults are of sound mind, and
Mill explains that they are "human beings in the maturity of their faculties."19
Furthermore, the principle only applies within "civilized" society.20
Mill adds that legitimately restricted harm must be committed "directly and in the
first instance; for whatever affects himself may affect others through himself."21 Direct
harm refers to when one person, without an intermediary, harms another. So, although an
individual may commit an act that is harmful to herself, the act cannot be prohibited on
the grounds that it indirectly harms others. For example, an individual would not be
prohibited from drinking alcohol on the grounds that drinking harmed her nephew
because it meant that she had less money to give the nephew for a birthday present.
The government may only legitimately restrict one person from harming another
when the victim is unwilling, or has not consented to the harm. Mill would not advocate
legally prohibiting "X" from harming "Y", if "Y" freely consented to the harm committed
by "X". In other words, a case where two people both freely consent to harm (or one
person freely consents to having the other harm him), Mill argues that the harmful action
should be legally allowed.
The harm principle provides Mill with an answer to the question of when the
government is justified in limiting the liberty of individuals. Some actions only directly
affect the person committing the action, and this conduct is "self-regarding". Other
actions not only affect the individual, but also other agents. The harmful actions that are
19
20

Ibid.
Ibid., 10.
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"other regarding" may be justifiably prohibited by the state. However, the state may not
legitimately restrict the conduct of an individual who is only harming himself.
The conception of the good for both Aristotle and Aquinas is that a single,
uniform mode of life for all adult males constitutes a life of happiness. In contrast, Mill
explains:
The same things which are helps to one person toward the cultivation of
his higher nature are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is healthy
excitement to one…while to another it is a distracting burden…Such are the
differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure [and] their
susceptibilities of pain…unless there is a corresponding diversity in their
modes of life, they neither obtain their fare share of happiness, nor grow up to
the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature which their nature is capable.22
No single mode of life constitutes the life of happiness and this idea is at the heart of
modern liberal pluralism. Mill concludes that the harm principle guarantees a sufficiently
broad scope of individual liberty that allows for many different modes of life.
The best method for a state to promote happiness and to help citizens develop
their faculties is by allowing them a wide range of personal liberty. If a state were to pass
paternalistic laws, it would then hinder the individual from truly developing her highest
human faculties. If the government attempts to create virtuous, happy citizens, it will
diminish the opportunity for each individual to deliberate and decide on what choices to
make in life. Through the process of deliberation, individuals strengthen their reason and
imagination. It is better to allow individuals to foster their intellectual skills than for the
government to select what is good or right for every individual.

21
22

Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 65.
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People must be allowed to make mistakes in order to learn from those mistakes
and develop their minds and character. Laws aimed at improving morality do not foster
this kind of development, and a government that can legislate morality will often do so in
the wrong way.23 For example, if a government prohibits certain acts that the
government views as immoral, the government will be likely to prohibit the development
of many great minds.24 Geniuses often break the traditional mold of acceptable behavior,
and a government may prohibit certain actions without fully understanding the value of
the actions. Mill argues that it seems foolish to allow “average minds” to dictate right and
wrong to a genius who may be thought to be immoral, but is not actually harming
anyone. If this potential genius is not allowed to fully explore the truth in the ways he
sees fit, then society at large suffers from him not developing his faculties. Finally,
whether the person is a genius or someone far more average, the individual has the most
knowledge and the strongest interest to pursue what is best for him. For this reason, one
should not allow the state to attempt to build virtuous citizens through paternalistic laws.
Mill concludes that the liberty that is lost will far outweigh any potential benefits of such
legislation.
Although Mill contends that the harm principle is a useful criterion for
determining when government intervention is permissible, he ultimately defends antipaternalism on the basis of the principle of utility. Mill derives the principle of utility,

23
24

Ibid., 81.
Ibid., 32.
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“the greatest happiness principle,” from the work of Jeremy Bentham.25 Bentham argues
that individuals and society should always act to bring about the greatest happiness for
the greatest number of people. Happiness for Bentham is a function of pleasure and pain,
and the happy person obtains pleasure and avoids pain. Society should create laws that
maximize the potential for the most pleasure and minimizes the opportunity for pain,
without elevating some pleasures to a superior status.
Although Mill utilizes the principle of utility, he rejects Bentham’s notion that all
pleasures are inherently equal. Mill writes: “[I]t is unquestionable fact that those who are
equally acquainted with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both [the
“higher” and “lower” [pleasures] do give a most marked preference to the manner of
existence which employs their higher faculties.”26 The happiness for human beings must
be distinguished from the happiness of beasts, and therefore happiness is much more than
sensual pleasure. Similar to Aristotle and Aquinas, Mill argues that happiness requires the
development of the higher human faculties. However, the three thinkers diverge with
respect to the means of achieving happiness. Aristotle believes that happiness is linked to
living in accordance with virtue and for Aquinas the glorification of God is entailed in his
notion of happiness. On the other hand, Mill argues that individual liberty is crucial for
achieving the happiness of which humans are capable as “progressive beings.”27
Contrasting with Bentham’s conception, Mill’s principle of utility can best be described
in the following terms: individuals and society should always act to bring about the
25
26

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher, (Hackett Publishing: 1979), 3.
Ibid., 9.
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greatest development and exercise of the higher human capabilities for the greatest
number of people.
According to Mill, the harm principle is ultimately justified because it best
promotes social utility. However, in many cases it appears that liberty in self-regarding
conduct does not promote more happiness. Many people freely choose self-regarding
actions that lead to misery, instead of happiness. For example, let us assume that “Susan”
chooses freely not to wear a seatbelt while driving a car. The harm principle allows Susan
to make this choice, since her decision to not wear a seatbelt poses no direct harm to
others. Susan gets into a terrible accident and can no longer walk, although it is likely that
had she been wearing a seatbelt, she would not have been severely harmed. Although the
harm principle allowed Susan to not wear a seatbelt, it certainly did not promote her
happiness. Moreover, if many others had experiences similar to Susan, the “happiness”
of society would be greatly diminished. Although it is possible that the seatbelt law
would diminish social utility, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to prove this
empirically. Protecting individual liberty with a strict rule mandating the use of seatbelts
might produce, overall, more happiness than unhappiness in society. However, Mill
provides no reason to think that implementing the harm principle will produce more
overall happiness in society in all cases, and there seems to be nothing that would
guarantee the harmony of the harm and utility principles across the many varied
circumstances of human life. It is possible to imagine an array of cases where

27

Mill, On Liberty, 10.
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government intervention in the lives of individuals might actually cause more happiness
for more people.
Although Mill argues that the state is not justified in preventing self-regarding
actions that may cause harm only to the individual, he does make an important exception.
Mill introduces an example where a person is attempting to a cross an unsafe bridge and
another individual or government agent sees this action. If the individual who was
witnessing the potential accident did not have time to warn the bridge crosser, then he
“might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement of his liberty; for
liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.”28
Mill argues that no loss of liberty emerges because the bridge crosser would never want
to cross the bridge if he had the knowledge that the bridge was actually unsafe. Once the
person was informed about the dangerous bridge, he would then be allowed to do as he
wished as long as he was not delirious or insane. Through this example, Mill concludes
that paternalistic interference is only justified when a person does not have adequate
information or has limited mental faculties. Even in these situations, Mill argues that a
person without adequate information should make her own choices once she the
appropriate information becomes available to her.
One can infer from the example of the bridge crosser that implicit in Mill’s
understanding of the harm principle is a notion of voluntariness. For example,
paternalistic interference is permissible in cases where an individual is misinformed or
mentally deficient. However, Mill does not adequately elaborate on the concept of

18

voluntariness. Using just the arguments of Mill, it would be difficult to determine in
many cases whether or not an individual’s actions were voluntary, involuntary, or a third
option that lies somewhere between the two extremes. Similarly, Mill frequently uses the
term “harm,” without elaborating on what constitutes harm. With both harm and
voluntariness, the meanings of these terms can only be inferred from Mill’s writings.
Neither concept is clearly defined or even clarified by Mill. Since harm and voluntariness
are terms crucial to the paternalism debate, it is necessary to adequately address the
meaning of these terms.
Fortunately, the debate over paternalism did not end with the arguments of Mill.
Contemporary philosophers have added distinctions and nuanced arguments in an attempt
to defend various paternalist and anti-paternalist positions. In the next section, I explain
how Joel Feinberg carefully clarifies the concepts of harm and voluntariness. In contrast
with Mill, Feinberg explicitly discusses the ideas of voluntariness and harm, thereby
offering a more comprehensive and defensible version of anti-paternalism.

IV. Feinberg’s Soft Paternalism

A. Defining Harm and Distinguishing Hard and Soft Paternalism

In this section, I explain how Feinberg defines harm and the distinction he draws
between hard and soft paternalism. In contrast with Mill, Feinberg provides a detailed
explanation of the meaning of harm. He describes three different senses of the term
28

Ibid., 95.
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“harm.”29 The first sense of harm is used to describe harm to objects, and is similar to the
terms “damaged” or “broken.” Feinberg uses the example of a vandal who breaks a
window. Although this sense of harm is commonly used, it is really only harm in a
“derivative” or “extended” sense.30 If people say that the window is harmed, they really
mean that the interests of the owner of the window have been harmed. The “harm”
caused to objects that have been damaged, broken, spoiled, et cetera, is only a
metaphorical harm, and therefore is not essential to the discussion in this thesis.
The second sense of harm is the most essential to the current discussion. Feinberg
defines harm as “the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.”31 The term
“interest” can be best described as a “stake” or claim in the well-being of someone or
something. If someone has a stake in a company, then her well-being is linked to the
company’s success. In other words, if the condition of the company improves, so does
the condition of the individual who has an interest in that company. A person’s
“interests” are a collection of all things in which one has a stake.32 The interests of an
individual (or what she is interested in) are what Feinberg refers to as “components” of a
person’s well-being. So an individual is “harmed” if some component of her well-being is
set back or defeated. For example, I may have an interest in attending a very important
job interview at two o’clock. If another person prevented me from attending the
interview, that person would be thwarting my attempt to further my own well-being,
29
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namely preventing me from an opportunity for future employment. Since attending this
interview is in my interest, the individual who prevented me from attending would cause
“harm” to me.
Feinberg defines a third sense of harm, which is a normative variation of the
second sense.33 If X harms Y, then X has “wronged” Y. In this sense, a person wrongs
another by committing an unjust act, or violating another person’s rights. However, since
Feinberg endorses the idea that consent nullifies wrong, he argues that a person cannot
harm (in this third sense) himself. He writes: “One class of harms (in the sense of setback to interests) must certainly be excluded from those that are properly called wrongs,
namely those to which the victim has consented.”34 If a person consents to the harm,
Feinberg concludes that it is not a wrongful harm. This third sense of harm is therefore
not applicable to a discussion about self-regarding harm. The hard paternalist or legal
moralist would likely disagree that all self-regarding harm is not “wrong.” For the sake of
clarity, I will use the term “harm” in the second sense, unless I explicitly state otherwise.
In the debate over whether or not the government is ever justified in paternalistic
interference when an individual is harming himself, defining harm in the third sense only
begs the question.
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The theories of hard and soft paternalism are differentiated from each other
through the weight each attaches to voluntariness and consent.35 In the next section, I
discuss the voluntariness standard in detail, but it is important to first get some
preliminary definitions of each theory. Feinberg defines hard paternalism in the following
terms:
Hard paternalism will accept as a reason for criminal legislation that it is
necessary to protect competent adults, against their will, from the harmful
consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and undertakings.36
Feinberg asserts that hard paternalism is “paternalism” in the truest sense, that is, the
government can coercively interfere in the lives of an individual for her own sake, even if
she poses no threat to others.
In contrast to hard paternalism, Feinberg defines and ultimately defends soft
paternalism. The soft paternalist is not clearly defending “paternalism” at all. Feinberg
often comments that the name “soft paternalism” is a bit of a misnomer, and the position
more clearly resembles anti-paternalism. He states:
Soft paternalism holds that the state has the right to prevent self-regarding
harmful conduct…when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish
whether it is voluntary or not.37
Feinberg’s position is similar to the one held by Mill. The government can only interfere
with self-regarding actions but only when the person's conduct is not voluntary. Also, as
in Mill’s example of the uninformed man crossing the bridge, the state may be allowed
35
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temporary intervention in order to determine whether the person is truly acting
voluntarily. Of course, the important distinction between hard and soft paternalism rests
on defining what constitutes a “voluntary” choice. I shall discuss this further in the next
section.

B. Autonomy and a Voluntariness Standard

The arguments defending hard and soft paternalism often hinge on how one
defines the terms “autonomy” and “voluntary,”38 as well as the weight that is attached to
these concepts in determining when it is permissible for the state to coercively intervene
in an individual’s conduct. Feinberg argues that personal autonomy is extremely
important, and that fully competent adults have the right to make their own choices, as
long as such choices do not harm other people. The autonomous individual can make
choices that harm her, and the government should not interfere and prevent her from
doing what may be harmful to her if she wishes to perform the harmful action. For
example, the government should not be able to prevent an individual from smoking if the
smoker is fully aware of the health risks and is not exposing other people to second-hand
smoke.39 Feinberg argues that one’s autonomy, or the voluntariness of one’s actions, is
connected to her consent. If a person has the capacity to consent as a fully competent
adult, and actually consents to harmful self-regarding actions, then the individual’s
37
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autonomy should trump the potential harm. Therefore, the government should not
coercively interfere by prohibiting such actions. Feinberg’s view is clearly expressed
when he states that an individual’s good and her right to self-determination (personal
autonomy) “usually correspond, but in those rare cases when they do not, a person’s right
of self-determination, being sovereign, takes precedence even over his own good.”40 So,
an individual’s right to self-determination must be respected even if the individual will
certainly cause harm to himself. The only government interference that is justified in
order to prevent self-regarding acts is the interference necessary to determine whether or
not a person’s conduct is voluntary.
The soft paternalist also must carefully distinguish what makes an individual’s
actions voluntary, or “voluntary enough.” So a person may engage in activities which are
risky, and which most people find to be completely ridiculous. However, Feinberg argues
that an individual with strange and unreasonable beliefs can still be sufficiently
autonomous to perform voluntary actions. Actions fall on a spectrum, and an individual
act can be either perfectly voluntary, non-voluntary, or, as most actions lie, somewhere
between these two extreme ends of the spectrum. A person who makes perfectly
voluntary choices must be completely informed, have no distractions, and be free from
coercion, and emotional problems or internal distractions. Feinberg admits that most,
“and perhaps even all choices,” are not perfectly voluntary.41

39

Ibid., 106.
Ibid., 61.
41
Ibid., 104.
40

24

Entirely non-voluntary choices are also rare; non-voluntary actions are the result
of being coerced, completely ignorant, or lacking certain mental or physical capabilities
due to some disability. For example, imagine a scenario where X grabs Y, and throws Y
into Z causing harm to Z. Y is not making a voluntary choice to harm Z because X is
coercing Y. Alternatively, a person could act in a nonvoluntary manner due to ignorance:
Feinberg gives the example of an individual mistakenly putting arsenic on his eggs,
supposing that the arsenic is table salt.42 In the first example, the person is not voluntarily
choosing to harm another agent, and in the second example the person is not voluntarily
choosing to harm himself. Feinberg labels choices that come close to being perfectly
voluntary as “fully voluntary,” and those choices that are close to being entirely nonvoluntary as “relatively non-voluntary.” The majority of actions that fall somewhere
between fully voluntary and relatively non-voluntary are often the actions that give rise to
the dispute between hard and soft paternalists.
People often perform acts that put themselves at great risk, but Feinberg explains
that only some of these risky actions are truly "irrational.”43 If a person is deranged,
insane, or mentally challenged he may frequently behave irrationally. The irrational
person is not truly himself and is therefore not autonomous. Since the irrational person is
incompetent, he is also not responsible (or at least not fully responsible) for his actions.
In addition to people who often act irrationally due to a mental defect, some people lack
rationality for a short time due to some form of cognitive impairment. For example, a
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person might experience temporary delusions or depart wildly from his own goals and
ideals. These types of severe, temporary departures from a person's usually rational
actions can be explained using the legal language of "temporary insanity."44 The
temporary and permanent irrational actions of individuals are close to perfect cases of
non-voluntary actions. At the bare minimum, irrational actions are not sufficiently
voluntary, nor do these actions give rise to much controversy for the hard or soft
paternalist. If a person is acting irrationally, the government is warranted in preventing
her from harming herself. The person is not choosing to cause self-harm, because such a
person is not making a voluntary choice. Yet, the government should only interfere with
irrational choices if the choices are harmful or potentially harmful. For example, even if
a person is acting entirely irrationally, the government should not interfere in the person’s
decision to choose chocolate over vanilla ice cream. Both the hard and soft paternalist
agree that the government should not interfere with actions that cause no risk to others or
the individual.
In order to help make this difficult distinction between voluntary (or voluntary
enough) and non-voluntary, Feinberg describes some “rules of thumb.”45 Feinberg
asserts that one should establish variable criteria for voluntariness, and each criterion
should have a different cut off point. Still, two rules will be important:
1. As the risk increases, so should the standard required for voluntariness for
the action to be permitted.
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2. The more irrevocable the harm that could be potentially caused by the
action, the higher the standard of voluntariness that is required for the
action to be permitted.46
Feinberg argues that a person who exhibits extremely risky and seemingly unreasonable
behavior must exhibit a high degree of voluntariness in his behavior. So, for example, if a
person wished to take a canoe over a waterfall, the government would be justified in
questioning whether or not this individual is sane. Furthermore, one might investigate if
the risk taker is being coerced or is perhaps under the influence of drugs. However, if an
individual could prove that she was just a thrill seeking person who otherwise exhibited
full mental competence, then, and only then, Feinberg would say that the government
should not interfere in her canoeing adventure. However, it is important to note that
Feinberg argues that this canoeing risk taker must meet a higher standard of voluntariness
than the person making choices that are far less risky and must prove that he meets it to
the government.

V. Criticisms of Feinberg and the Case for Hard Paternalism

A. The Voluntariness Standard Examined

In the previous section, I outlined Feinberg’s distinctions that lead him to his softpaternalist position. Although I use many of the same distinctions, I reach a very
different conclusion than does Feinberg. In this section, I first examine the voluntariness
46
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standard and then begin to establish an argument in favor of hard paternalism. Before
attempting the argument, I try to illustrate some of the weaknesses of Feinberg's
voluntariness standard through an analysis of both hypothetical and actual examples. The
purpose of the examples is not to provide a substitute for Feinberg's particular notion of
voluntariness, but instead to build an intuitively attractive case that additional information
must be considered when examining whether or not the government may legitimately
interfere with someone's self-regarding, harmful actions. The soft paternalist will only
prevent an individual from harming himself if the person’s conduct is not sufficiently
voluntary. I suggest that one reason to prefer hard paternalism is that the hard paternalist
may consider the individual's safety and health.
Let us assume that the hypothetical “Jenny” is a twenty-three-year-old woman
who has been raised since childbirth by an extreme religious cult known as the Children
of God (C.O.G.). She has always lived under the strict rules and guidelines established by
the cult, and as she became an adult, she maintained these beliefs. The C.O.G. believe
that it is a sin to wear seatbelts or motorcycle helmets because these items hinder God’s
will. If you wear these protective devices, you are not fully trusting in God to protect you.
Jenny would never wear a seatbelt or a motorcycle helmet because doing so would be
evil. Furthermore, Jenny practices various acts of self-mutilation every night as a way to
repent for her many sinful thoughts. Some of these acts of self-mutilation are quite severe
and could lead to serious medical problems. Other than these “strange” religious beliefs,
Jenny is a fully competent intelligent adult. She has attended college, and she is currently
enrolled in her first year of medical school. She is aware of the dangers of her risky
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actions, and doctors have even advised her that her self-mutilation could cause long-term
medical problems. Her upbringing has shaped her beliefs, but she is in no way coerced to
perform any of her unconventional actions. For Jenny, it would be irrational to wear
seatbelts or to not practice self-mutilation, because doing these things would hinder her
from getting into heaven. She has weighed and considered the medical risks, but she
believes that her entry into heaven is far more important than her safety. So, she will
continue to not wear seatbelts, and worse yet, will engage in nightly acts of selfmutilation.
An autonomous individual is a person who is self-governing, or freely makes her
own choices. However, just as one’s actions may never be fully voluntary, one may never
be completely autonomous. Environment, family, friends, and other factors often shape a
person’s beliefs. Still, like Feinberg, I agree that a spectrum exists, and that one’s
judgments and actions may not come entirely from his “self,” yet one can still be
sufficiently autonomous to have a right against government intervention in much of one’s
conduct. However, if a person can hardly be said to have her own beliefs, then it seems
difficult to say that she acts autonomously. Jenny’s beliefs seem dangerous and
unreasonable, but she was given these beliefs as a child. She is twenty-three, and she still
holds the same dangerous beliefs that she has had since childhood.
Feinberg would most likely state that the government should not interfere in
preventing Jenny from harming herself. Jenny’s beliefs would most likely be viewed by
Feinberg as eccentric and perhaps even unreasonable, but he states that “eccentric and
even unreasonable judgments of the relative worthwhileness of that which is risked and
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that which is gained do not count against voluntariness at all.”47 No matter how
unreasonable Jenny's actions appear, I believe Feinberg would conclude that her conduct
is indeed voluntary. However, Feinberg would not likely make such a decision without
careful reflection, and without first applying his rules of thumb. Jenny's actions would
necessitate a high voluntariness standard because her actions are both very risky, and the
harm to her is quite possibly irrevocable. Therefore, Jenny could be questioned, and
detained to check on whether or not her actions are voluntary. Feinberg writes the
following about investigating the voluntariness of an individual’s conduct:
Reasonableness is one thing, and voluntariness is another. Yet one way of
persuading a panel of voluntariness or a presumptively nonvoluntary selfdamaging act is to offer some reason for it, even a bad reason, so long as it
is relevant reason that renders the mysterious more intelligible. If the
presumption of psychosis is correct, however, no such reason will be
forthcoming.48
Jenny is an excellent candidate for being "presumptively" non-voluntary, but she could
certainly respond to why she is committing the damaging acts: she wishes to enter
heaven. Her choices may seem odd to many, but they are certainly consistent with her
system of values and beliefs. Although she could be questioned and temporarily detained
she would likely meet Feinberg's voluntariness standard and could certainly give a
“relevant reason.” Thus, she would be permitted to self-mutilate on his criteria.
The example of Jenny is hypothetical, but numerous people engage in acts of selfmutilation. I will briefly examine the case of young women in Kenya who practice
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female genital mutilation (FGM).49 Unlike hypothetical examples, one cannot isolate the
variables for the sake of argument when dealing with real life practices. The example of
FGM is no exception. Throughout the world, different groups of people practice FGM,
and the operation varies from the removal of the tip of the clitoris to the complete
removal of the clitoris, parts of the labia minora and majora, and in some cases the
sewing together of the remaining tissue.50 In addition to the variations in the operation,
the procedure is performed on girls as young as four years of age to women well into
their adulthood. I shall look more closely at the practices of the Saboat people in
Kikhome, Kenya.
Cultural anthropologist Christine Walley lived with the Saboat in the 1980's, and
she taught high-school-age students. The Saboat practiced FGM, and the procedure was
usually performed on girls between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. When the girls
believed that they were ready for the procedure and ceremony signifying their passage
into womanhood, they would approach elders about beginning the process. In 1982, FGM
was officially outlawed in Kenya, yet the practice continued in many places. Among the
Saboat people, many (but not all) young women continued having the procedure
performed on them. Walley observed that the young women disagreed about the practice;
while some of the Saboat denounced the procedure, others supported it.51 The practice of
FGM not only often has the effect of reducing or eliminating sexual pleasure, but also can
49
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lead to a host of medical problems, including the possibility of hemorrhage, infections,
urination difficulties, and the formation of cysts. Walley spoke often and frankly with her
teenage students, and to her initial surprise "there was no delusion among the adolescent
girls, some of whose married and unmarried peers were already pregnant, about how it
would affect their sexual pleasure."52 Furthermore, many of the teens would have likely
known of the potential health risks through schooling, the government opposition, or due
to witnessing problems in older women in the community. Still, some young women
chose to continue with the procedure, and even claimed that they would certainly want
their future daughters to do the same.
Much like the earlier hypothetical example, one cannot easily discern if these
young women are acting voluntarily. By American standards, the teens have not yet
reached the age of consent. However, in Kikhome, Kenya, women between the age of
fourteen and sixteen are often married and participate as adults in the community in
which they reside. Furthermore, the young women choose the time at which they have the
procedure, and many are aware of the potential health and risks to their future pleasure.
On the other hand, the teens no doubt feel the societal pressure of becoming a "woman."
Like Jenny, most people today (particularly Americans) would view this practice as
abhorrent, and certainly as an unreasonable choice. But among the Saboat, the choice is
far from unreasonable and is often "freely" chosen. Feinberg expressly notes that in cases
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of genital mutilation, the initial presumption should be that the action is not voluntary.53
The voluntariness standard would also be set quite high due to the risk and irrevocable
damage caused by the operation. Still, it is unclear that, after questioning and reasoning
with a young woman in Kikhome, she would change her mind about the procedure.
Certainly, even after being told of the consequences, Walley observed that some young
women did not change their mind. I am not certain what conclusion Feinberg would
reach on this specific case, but it seems as if the soft paternalist would respect the choice
and allow the procedure. Both in the case of Jenny and with the practice of FGM in
Kenya, the standard of voluntariness is difficult to apply. Russ Shafer-Landau comments
that on the subject of voluntariness "Feinberg wisely declines to do anything other than
give general guidelines."54 The general guidelines Feinberg proposes are sound
guidelines. However, even with sound guidelines for judging voluntariness, Feinberg’s
anti-paternalism fails because it ignores the importance of the principle that government
should show equal concern and respect to all citizens. In the next section, I will argue that
the hard paternalist strategy better meets the principle of equal concern and respect by
allowing the government to restrict liberty in order to protect the agent’s own safety and
well-being.
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B. Case for Hard Paternalism

It is interesting to note that just as Feinberg believes that soft-paternalism is a bit
of a misnomer for his seemingly anti-paternalist argument, I believe that hard paternalism
is also a misnomer. I shall use the term “hard paternalism,” as Feinberg does, because it
is commonly used in the literature to describe the position held by those who argue that
the government is sometimes justified in interfering with the individual in acts which are
harmful and self-regarding. Or, at the bare minimum, the government is right to consider
the good of the individual as a relevant reason for prohibiting an act. However, the case
for hard paternalism is not actually a very “hard” stance. The hard paternalist should be
carefully distinguished from the legal moralist; the hard paternalist needs only to show
that there are some (albeit rare) situations when the government is justified in interfering
with voluntary, self-regarding actions that are harmful to the individual. The legal
moralist argues that the government may legitimately criminalize immoral actions, even
if the actions cause no direct harm to the individual or other people. Just as Aristotle and
Aquinas argue that the state should create laws that promote virtuous citizens, the
contemporary legal moralist concludes that the state may prohibit certain "harmless"
immoral actions because these actions corrupt the environment necessary for promoting
virtuous citizens.55 The hard paternalist, or at least the version of hard paternalism which
I defend, only limits an individual's actions in certain cases-- namely, when the actions
put the person at risk of direct and severe harm. In other words, the aim of the hard
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paternalist is not to create virtuous citizens through government intervention, but instead
to prevent certain individuals from harming themselves while still respecting the
individual's autonomy.
Feinberg does not make a straw man of the hard paternalist in the aforementioned
regard. In fact, he characterizes the “softer” hard paternalist as one who argues that one’s
self-determination and personal autonomy usually corresponds with the person’s own
good, “but in those rare cases when they do not, we must balance the person’s right
against his good and weigh them intuitively.”56 I shall defend this version of hard
paternalism by arguing that such a balancing strategy is necessary to determine whether
or not government interference is permissible. In particular cases, working out this
balancing strategy could be extremely difficult. However, the fact that such a strategy is
difficult offers no reason to reject it outright. Feinberg argues that this balancing strategy
does not genuinely respect one’s personal sovereignty. I shall argue that this view can
indeed respect personal autonomy and that, more importantly, personal autonomy should
not always trump an individual’s well being or safety.
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin argues that fairness requires that the
laws show equal concern and respect for all citizens.57 Building on concepts put forth by
John Rawls, Dworkin argues that the laws should not favor any particular group, and in
fact, that fair laws might be laws chosen behind the “veil of ignorance.” I argue that the
laws should in fact show equal concern and respect for all citizens, and that sometimes
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the government can show equal concern and respect by implementing paternalistic
laws.58 However, let me be clear that I shall define more specifically what I mean by
equal concern and respect, since I will not be using Dworkin’s definition. I will be using
these terms to defend an argument that Dworkin does not and would not defend. Still, the
expression should serve as a starting point for my hard paternalist argument, and the
principle of equal concern and respect seems to be an intuitively attractive idea.
I make another small addendum to the idea of equal concern and respect. The
government should create laws that show equal and adequate concern and respect for all
citizens. So, a government could potentially show equal concern and respect by showing
no respect or concern for any citizen. For this reason, it is useful to add that the respect
and concern should be adequate or appropriate, in addition to being equal. I shall take the
word “concern” here to mean the concern for an individual’s well-being, safety, and
personal good. So, a government that shows equal and adequate concern tries to promote
the well-being, safety, and “good” of every individual, and tries to do so as much as it can
and equally for all. However, the government must show respect in addition to concern. It
is here that autonomy becomes important. A government shows equal and adequate
respect for its citizens by respecting the personal sovereignty, individual choices, and
autonomy of every individual equally, and allowing each individual as much autonomy
as possible. Therefore, a government that creates laws that attempt to show equal and
adequate concern and respect for its citizens is faced with the difficult challenge of
58
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balancing concern and respect, two concepts that can come into conflict. It is here that
Feinberg and I, or the hard and soft paternalist, will diverge. As I have defined these
terms, Feinberg would give far more weight to respect than concern. I will argue that
particularly in certain cases that both respect and concern must be considered seriously.
In the previous examples, I have attempted to illustrate the difficulties in utilizing
the voluntariness standard. I shall provide one more hypothetical example, but this time I
will intentionally choose an example where few people will question whether or not the
individual’s conduct is voluntary. The following example is a case in which I will argue
that even though the conduct is fully voluntary, government interference is permissible to
prevent the individual from causing self-harm. In order to show equal concern and
respect for the individual, paternalistic interference is warranted.
Let us assume that James is a twenty-five-year-old philosophy graduate student.
James is well versed in analytic reasoning, and he generally exhibits both rational and
reasonable behaviors. For the past year, James has participated in karate classes after his
Tuesday and Thursday philosophy classes. He is not the best student in his karate class,
but he loves participating in the sport. James has recently decided to enter a No-HoldsBarred Fighting Championship, where he will compete with far more experienced
fighters. Since James does not want to encourage children to fight or glorify violence, he
has chosen a tournament that is funded by wealthy spectators. The contest will be held in
the mountains of North Carolina, and only a select group of adults will watch the fights.
The wealthy spectators are offering a one-million-dollar cash prize, and the fight has been
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legally sanctioned by the state. Since the cash prize is large, some of the world's best
fighters will participate. Due to the rules of the contest, a team of psychiatrists evaluates
each participant, particularly those who have never participated in such a competition.
James must acknowledge that he is aware of the risks and sign a waiver to participate. In
previous, similar competitions, several people have been severely injured, and a few have
actually been killed, but James still signs the waiver.
Although James would need to meet a high standard of voluntariness due to the
health risks, his choice to participate in the contest would no doubt be considered by
Feinberg at the bare minimum "voluntary enough." Feinberg endorses the volenti maxim,
and he argues that two party cases where both people consent operate like cases of selfregarding harm. In other words, since both parties are acting voluntarily, the harm
principle would not be applicable in this case. Furthermore, if any harm is caused to
society at large through this contest, the harm is minimal and indirect. James has not been
coerced, and he is not deranged or insane. He is simply an individual who very much
wants to participate in No-Holds-Barred fighting despite the risks. The problem with
James's choice is that it has a high probability to lead to severe injury or even death.
James is a novice, competing against experts. James is participating in an extremely risky
activity that could lead to irrevocable harm. The best he can hope to gain is an enjoyable
experience and more pride in his ability. However, this outcome is unlikely.
The example of James is meant to elicit the intuition that it is permissible for the
government to prohibit James and all other similarly inexperienced fighters from this
competition. If this particular example does not elicit such an intuition, perhaps the
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example of people who wish to receive unnecessary amputations, lobotomies, or
dangerous surgery for minor cosmetic purposes might give rise to the intuition.59
Admittedly, this is not an argument in favor of general paternalistic interference; it is
only a series of examples that hopefully give a reason for people to begin considering
personal health and safety as relevant (but not necessarily sufficient) reasons for
potentially legitimate government prohibitions against certain self-regarding harms.
The government is not usually justified in paternalistic interference; still, society
should show equal and adequate concern and respect for its citizens. A person cannot
make any choices or perform any actions if they are dead and could be severely limited in
their choices if severely injured. Furthermore, a person can harm herself in a way that
makes her extremely “unfree” through a free choice. It is in these cases that the
government must show concern as well as respect. In cases such as Jenny or with the
Kenyans practicing FGM, voluntariness is difficult to determine. However, the risk and
potential harm can be fairly easily assessed in these situations. The government has many
tools to determine (studies, etc.), for example, that self-mutilation is usually extremely
harmful to one's physical and emotional stability. In addition to the physical harm, selfmutilation could potentially hinder one from making later voluntary choices. So, in order
to show both concern and respect, the government is justified in taking account the
interest of the individual in avoiding such harmful self-regarding acts. Even in the case
of James, where one can determine that his conduct is voluntary, a permissible way to
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show both concern and respect is to prohibit his participation the No-Holds-Barred
competition. In such a case, a balancing strategy should be preferred, weighing the risk to
his safety with his autonomy. Although James may have his autonomy "violated" in this
one case, he could in the future be able to make many more choices that he may not be
able to make if he is physically confined due to paralysis as a result of the competition.
Just as the soft paternalist struggles to determine whether or not an individual’s
conduct is voluntary, the hard-paternalist strategy is not without problems. Utilizing some
of Feinberg's criteria for the voluntariness standard, I provide a few rules of thumb for a
hard-paternalist balancing strategy. In most cases, if a person’s conduct is sufficiently
voluntary, she should be allowed to participate in whatever activities she chooses. The
following guidelines can simply be used as a starting point for when, and the manner in
which, the government may legitimately exercise paternalistic intervention:
1) It is difficult to determine whether or not someone’s conduct is voluntary even
after the person is questioned.
2) The activities being performed are generally regarded as highly unreasonable.
3) The risk of self-regarding harm (or two-party consensual harm) is extremely
high.
4) The harm that could occur is likely to be severe.
5) The harm that could occur is likely to be irrevocable.
6) The potential severe harm is likely to occur in the near future, although it may
also have lasting effects. (The harm should be differentiated from actions that
cause slight harm that could eventually accumulate into a larger health risk)
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7) The infringement on the individual's liberty is appropriately executed, and is in
no way excessive relative to the act of self-harm.
The strength of the hard-paternalist balancing strategy rests in part on the fact that it
allows each act to be examined on a case-by-case basis. I am not creating a formulaic
procedure for applying guidelines that I expect will yield a determinate answer in all
cases, and I believe it would be foolish to suggest as a general meta-rule, for example,
that if three of the five guidelines are met, that paternalistic interference is warranted.
Instead, these guidelines can be used as a framework for the balancing strategy to
structure our thinking about particular cases. Finally, this list of guidelines is not
exhaustive, and the aim of my strategy is to best both respect and protect the individual.
As I have already mentioned, the government need not step in to prevent most actions,
even when the actions are harmful to the individual.
Both the hard and soft paternalists would agree that a case that met the first
guideline might warrant government intervention. I argued earlier that Feinberg and I
would likely disagree on whether or not certain actions are voluntary enough. However,
the soft paternalist would simply argue that paternalism would be allowed until the
person can sufficiently show that she is acting voluntarily. The second guideline can
serve as a relevant but never sufficient reason for paternalistic interference. In other
words, if an action is incredibly unreasonable, a closer look at the motives of the
individual might be in order. However, many actions may seem unreasonable, and if the
individual is not putting himself at risk of severe harm, then the action should be allowed.
Again, this guideline is not something that the soft paternalist would necessarily dispute.
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Guidelines 3 through 6 all pertain to the harm or risk of harm to the individual,
and it is here where the hard and soft paternalist will disagree. The soft paternalist argues
that all of the aforementioned guidelines might warrant a closer look at whether or not
someone’s conduct is voluntary, but it is the voluntariness alone that ultimately
determines the permissibility of paternalism. In contrast, my hard paternalist view holds
that voluntariness does not necessarily dictate whether paternalism is permissible. The
cases of Jenny, women practicing FGM, and James all meet guidelines 3 through 6 even
if we assume adequate voluntariness. The harm is either certain, or at least a very high
risk, and the damage is likely to be severe and irrevocable. My claim is that the state
should show concern as well as respect for the individuals and therefore may prevent
them from committing the actions they propose to take because these actions have a high
probability of leading to grave danger to the agents themselves.
It is difficult in any of these cases to state that by allowing people to harm
themselves that the government is protecting their autonomy. The likelihood that the
individuals will limit their future liberty by committing these acts far outweighs the
possibility they will somehow be freer in the present. When attempting to respect an
individual’s autonomy, one must consider that the self exists over time. Even if a person
commits certain acts freely, the result of the actions might be less overall autonomy in her
complete life. Odysseus was acting wisely when he asked his fellow sailors to limit his
present autonomy by tying him to the mast, in order to gain more overall autonomy when
he avoided the deadly calls of the Sirens. However, many do not act with the foresight of

42

Odysseus, and in some situations, the government may justifiably limit their harmful,
self-regarding actions to preserve the risk takers overall autonomy.
Aristotle argued that happiness was acting in accordance with virtue over the
course of a lifetime. He wrote: “One swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day;
nor similarly does one day or a short time make us blessed and happy.”60 Just as a single
action or activity does not constitute happiness, a single action does not make an
individual free or autonomous, and, in contrast to the anti-paternalist, I contend that
autonomy-over-a-lifetime is a relevant consideration in determining whether government
is permitted to intervene in a person’s voluntary conduct. Voluntariness is a matter of
autonomy at a moment, not autonomy over a life.
The sixth guideline is to safeguard against the government attempting to intervene
in more "minor" risky actions. In other words, the hard paternalism that I am defending
does not prohibit people from smoking, drinking, or eating fatty foods because it is in
their best interest. Although these actions might put people at risk, the harm is gradual
and not immediately severe. These behaviors should certainly be discouraged, but I am
not making a case that such actions warrant paternalism.
Finally, the seventh guideline addresses the issue of punishment. The punishment
in these hard cases needs to fit the crime. Perhaps, for example, the individuals in the
examples would be prohibited from such acts and required to go through counseling.
Most people who commit self-regarding harms would not be best served by lengthy
imprisonment or harsh punishments. The purpose of the balancing strategy is to show the
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citizens concern and provide them with what would usually amount to temporary
protection from their harmful activities. Some may argue that counseling is not
punishment, and I would concur. However, one aim of punishment is rehabilitation, and
if the courts mandate the counseling, it certainly is a form of paternalistic intervention.
The hard paternalist needs only to argue that in some cases the government is justified in
preventing (not punishing) people from self-regarding harms. It is not my intent in this
essay to determine the legal punishment for particular acts of self-regarding harm; I wish
to assert only that the government is sometimes justified in utilizing the hard-paternalist
strategy to prevent severe cases of harm to self.

VI. Conclusion

After carefully examining both the hard and soft-paternalist strategies, I have
argued that a version of hard paternalism that examines actions on a case-by-case basis
and considers factors beyond voluntariness will show equal concern and respect for all
people. The fear in allowing any form of paternalism is that the end result will be a
government that legislates morality, and that people will no longer be truly free.
Freedom is not always simply doing whatever one wants, and the end result of allowing
paternalistic interference in some cases need not lead to a government which makes
personal choices for people. Still, autonomy needs to be respected, and any body of
citizens should safeguard themselves against overzealous government intervention.

60

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9.
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The hard-paternalist balancing strategy is often not easy to implement, but no strategy
will be exempt from difficult cases and exceptions to any rules of thumb. I have provided
a few general guidelines that can serve as a jumping off point for how to implement the
balancing strategy. Difficult cases require the government to utilize as much information
as possible, and factors other than the individual’s informed consent should be
considered. In certain cases where an individual puts himself at an extremely high risk of
irrevocable harm, I have argued that only the hard-paternalist strategy can adequately
show the individual both concern and respect.
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